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Abstract: Critiques of modernity often align with critiques of the existing institutions of lib-
eral democracy. We argue that the degrowth movement can learn from the experience of past 
critiques of modernity by avoiding their major mistake – that is, (inadvertently) conflating a 
critique of modernity with a rejection of liberal democratic institutions. Hence, we suggest to 
frame degrowth as the promotion of new vocabularies within a deliberative account of democ-
racy. Specifically, we proceed in three steps: first, we briefly review some essential critiques 
of modernity and their stance towards liberal democracy. Second, we illustrate how some of 
the argumentative patterns within the degrowth literature may inadvertently endanger core 
values of the open society. Third, we introduce our perspective on a liberal degrowth that 




1. Liberal democracy on the defense 
Liberal democracy is on the defense. A cultural backlash against “liberal cosmopolitanism” 
currently drives right-wing populism around the world (Inglehart and Norris 2016). For dec-
ades already, the support for democracy as a form of government has been receding world-
wide, especially so among the younger generations (Foa and Mounk 2017). Meanwhile, in 
left-alternative debates, calls arise for radical transformations away from the founding institu-
tions of liberal capitalist democracies, such as private property (van Griethuysen 2012) or 
markets as means of resource allocation (Trainer 2011: 80). What is more, fundamental dem-
ocratic institutions are explicitly up for re-consideration: “I am not afraid to draw the conclu-
sion that emancipatory politics should not be bound a priori by formal democratic procedures; 
people quite often do not know what they want, or do not want what they know, or they simp-
ly want the wrong thing” (Žižek, interviewed in Browne 2016).  
Furthermore, critiques of liberal democracy often originate from or align with critiques of 
modernity. Authors such as Illich, Marcuse and Heidegger, who offered more general cri-
tiques of modern culture and society, also displayed an ambivalent if not hostile attitude to-
wards the institutions of liberal democracy. For a historical example, consider Germany’s 
embrace of National Socialism in the 1930s, which has been interpreted as a “crisis of moder-
nity” (Schwaabe 2005): the discontents caused by industrialized capitalism and mass culture, 
including a deep sense of uncertainty and alienation, gave rise to mental dispositions highly 
receptive for anti-liberal ideologies. The Third Reich also illustrates the possibility of “reac-
tionary modernism”, in that technological and scientific progress continued in full contempt 
of political liberalism as a main ideological tenet of modernity (Herf 1984). So we are con-
fronted with a conflicted overall relation between modernity, liberal democracy and their crit-
ics. The interest of the present paper, then, is for the following prospect: a radical critique of 
modernity may entail a rejection of (some) existing institutions of liberal democracy – thereby 
(and possibly inadvertently) endangering core values of the open society. 
Given this context, what is the degrowth movement’s stance towards liberal democracy? As 
the degrowth movement is very heterogeneous, no clear and unanimous answer exists. Con-
sider the empirical survey by Eversberg and Schmelzer (2017), who surveyed the attitudes of 
attendants to the 2014 International Degrowth Conference: they portray a “degrowth spec-
trum” characterized by “conflictual diversity”, within which they delineate five main currents. 
Amongst these currents, the “immanent reformers” promote “a pragmatic and gradualist 
transformation within existing institutions” (ibid.: 14f). By contrast, the “sufficiency-oriented 
critics of civilization” perceive “contemporary society as rotten to the core and ultimately 
doomed” (ibid.: 13); thus, they regard institutional reforms as futile and suggest to better pre-
pare for the inevitable civilizational collapse. 
Against this background, we explore the ambivalent relation between degrowth, modernity, 
and liberal democracy. As conceptual focal point of our analysis serves the “unfinished pro-
ject of modernity” (Habermas 1994[1980]), that is, the striving for a just society via the au-
tonomous development of science, morality, law and the arts. Basically, this concept aims to 
capture the legacy of the Enlightenment. In this context, a minimum specification of an over-
all attitude that is in line with the project of modernity can be found in Popper’s (2011[1945]: 
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513) notion of the “open society” – a society “in which men have learned to be to some extent 
critical of taboos, and to base decision on the authority of their own intelligence (after discus-
sion).” Liberal democracy figures as the current institutional embodiment of this notion. In 
other words, liberal democracy is the provisional answer to the question: “How can we so 
organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too 
much damage?” (Popper 2011[1945]: 115). This is – admittedly and purposely – a very mod-
est minimum requirement with two implications: First, a wide variety of actual political and 
economic institutions may practically fulfil this requirement. Amongst others, one might think 
of a highly decentralized political system based on participatory processes and democratic 
control over significant parts of the economy. Second, none of this implies the appeal to a 
universalist, a-historic conception of reason. On the contrary, moral and societal progress can 
be understood as the widening and deepening of solidarity (Rorty 1987) – past examples 
might include suffrage for woman, social security and universal healthcare, more recent ex-
amples being same-sex marriage and animal rights.  
Still, existing liberal democracies clearly fall short of fully delivering on the promises of the 
project of modernity, so a crucial issue reads: is the project to be abandoned as a whole or is it 
just unfinished, as Habermas and others have thought? Does it offer enough to justify being 
continually revised and reconstructed? After all, modernity is a normative project based on 
the premise that, in principle, social progress is possible and desirable. Our main argument, 
then, reads as follows: the degrowth movement may learn from the experience of past cri-
tiques of modernity by avoiding their major mistake – that is, (inadvertently) conflating a cri-
tique of modernity with a rejection of the open society.   Against this backdrop, we follow 
Rorty’s (1987) suggestion to base our “social hopes” on the promotion of new vocabularies: 
from this perspective, the degrowth movement is about increasing the range of people who 
use a specific vocabulary – one that revolves around notions such as “sufficiency” and “con-
viviality” rather than “net worth” or “efficient market hypothesis”. We also draw on Haber-
mas’ (1984; 1987), Sen’s (2009) and others’ understanding of democracy through the lens of 
public deliberation, with less focus on specific institutions such as elections.  By enriching 
Habermas’ notion of the unfinished project of modernity with Rorty’s and Popper’s perspec-
tives, we sketch possible elements of a liberal approach to degrowth. In a nutshell: Popper sets 
the minimal standards for the values prevalent in the open society and Rorty demonstrates 
how liberal degrowthists may advance Habermas’s vision of fulfilling the project of moderni-
ty.1 Overall, the aim is to tackle the hypertrophies of modernity without losing its many 
achievements. In this sense, we argue that the degrowth movement needs to clarify its stance 
towards modernity and its different aspects, lest it endangers liberal democracy by trying to 
remedy the ills modernity has brought about.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 exemplarily reviews some influential and 
instructive cases of modernity critique (Heidegger, Illich, Marcuse and Zerzan) in comparison 
with Habermas’s vision. Subsequently, Section 3 traces ambivalence towards liberal democ-
                                                          
1 We do not intend to devise here an encompassing and systematic theory of modernity ourselves and we 
acknowledge some differences between the authors drawn upon: For instance, we are aware that Habermas has 
in mind a more ambitious concept of reason than Popper, and that the combination of Rorty’s approach with 
elements of Habermas’ deliberative democratic theory may be seen as challenging; yet this combination is nei-
ther impossible nor insensible, as we hope to demonstrate (see also Dieleman 2017; Niżnik and Sanders 1996). 
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racy by some strands of the degrowth movement and relates them to general doubts whether 
the project of modernity should be pursued. Section 4 proposes to frame degrowth as promo-
tion of new vocabularies within a deliberative democratic framework. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes our argument and draws conclusions. 
2. The critique of modern civilization 
This chapter provides an overview of important topoi of modernity critique and sketches the 
varying severity of the critiques by Heidegger, Illich, Marcuse, Zerzan and Habermas. In do-
ing so, it demonstrates the affinity of the more radical critiques towards a dismissal of liberal 
democracy as opposed to the Habermasian critique that aims to correct rather than abandon 
the project of modernity. The topoi discussed in this chapter have also inspired the degrowth 
discourse – though not all authors are explicitly acknowledged as degrowth precursors: Our 
aim here is not to depict a genealogy of the degrowth discourse but to briefly review essential 
modernity critiques, some of which can be fruitfully linked to existing currents within the 
degrowth movement. Thus, throughout the rest of the paper, we will indicate some references 
from the degrowth discourse to these critics of modernity.2 
2.1 Heidegger or “life in inauthenticity” 
Heidegger’s opus is notoriously ambivalent. In what follows, we review some of the more 
radical and dark strands; yet we will also point to the more relaxed aspects in his writing in 
Chapter 4.1. Heidegger generally delivers a stern assessment of the modern condition; he ex-
presses an “anti-humanistic nostalgia for a world with higher meanings than our own” (Rich-
ardson 2012: 369). Following Heidegger, there are two basic ways of approaching nature – 
Hervorkommenlassen and Herausfordern. The first implies that man lets nature reveal itself. 
Literally, the German word means that humanity does not actively approach nature; rather, 
she lets nature come out of hiding by itself. Thus, it is a contemplative stance that waits for 
nature to show what it truly is. By implication, man cannot produce this kind of truth or con-
trol the process towards it; it is about meditative thinking and preserving an open attitude. 
Unfortunately (according to Heidegger), mankind has for a long time embarked on the second 
way, which refers to humanity’s “challenging” of nature. By way of calculative thinking, man 
successfully attacks and conquers nature. The emergence of modern science is pivotal here, as 
scientific rationalism facilitated and established this paradigm of control and management 
(Cooper 2005). 
The ubiquity of this frame of mind, and the inescapability of the ensuing processes, once set 
in motion, may be illustrated by man’s paradoxical involvement with technology where posi-
tive feedback loops strengthen our entrapment: technology-driven problems can only be 
solved via technology (see García et al, 2017). But it was not through the use of technology 
that we created our modern predicament in the first place. Rather, technology is only an ex-
tension of the general challenging approach towards nature. The consequence of all this is 
                                                          
2 Certainly, other critiques of modernity have also been voiced (e.g. by Charles Taylor, Cornelius Castoriadis), 
but a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this section which first and foremost aims to illustrate the 
varying severity and the different foci within the literature criticizing modernity. 
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epistemic failure: “The question concerning technology is the question concerning the con-
stellation in which revealing and concealing, in which the essential unfolding of truth comes 
to pass” (Heidegger 1977[1954]: 315). In other words, the challenging approach entails a con-
cealment of the truth: our openness is lost and so is our access to being. As a result, we are 
confined to a life in Un-Eigentlichkeit (in-authentic life). Hence, the modern human condition 
is one of spiritual weakness and inauthenticity. 
Heidegger’s stance towards politics in the Weimar Republic mirrors this dire epistemic diag-
nosis. Political instability in Germany’s first parliamentary democracy exacerbated an already 
widespread sense of uncertainty as the main signum of the societal “crisis of modernity” 
(Schwaabe 2005). Thus, Heidegger’s longing for existential and spiritual renewal reflects a 
sentiment shared by many of his contemporaries (cf. Gumbrecht 1998). It also yields a desire 
for apolitical politics, for a revolution that jolts the political sphere out of the realm of merely 
interest-driven bargaining. In last consequence, Heidegger’s critique of modernity gave way 
to staunch anti-liberalism. His ensuing involvement with Nazism, if only temporary, was ar-
dent and not accidental – Heidegger’s Nazism, of course, is a topic of its own, which we will 
not explore in more depth here.3 For the purposes of this article, it suffices to retain the fol-
lowing point: the anti-modern mindset and vocabulary provide a fertile ground for a rejection 
of the open society, as the latter embodies modern life in all its facets. At the same time, the 
late Heidegger’s “releasement” approach, which exhibits a more relaxed stance towards the 
modern world, has recently been invoked as a promising inspiration for degrowth’s relation-
ship towards technology (Heikkurinen 2016, see Section 4.1). 
2.2 Illich or “the loss of autonomy” 
In a way, Illich, who has become a popular source for degrowthists (e.g., Samerski 2017, 
Demaria et al. 2013), echoes and radicalizes previous critiques of the rationalizing process of 
modernity as described, for instance, by Max Weber. Modernity yields societal differentiation 
into separate subsystems, each of which follows its particular logic, and concomitant process-
es of rationalization and bureaucratization of each and every aspect of life. In Illich’s view, 
this does not only imply a disenchantment of the world, but also leads to a loss of autonomy 
and actual damage for individuals. Specifically, Illich contends that the very institutions 
commonly interpreted as improving individual liberty and societal welfare actually rather 
work to the individuals’ detriment: Healthcare, the legal system, schools and public transport 
transform autonomous individuals into patients, clients, students, and commuters. Thus, mo-
dernity replaces communality, mutuality and autonomy with ruthless systemic necessities. 
Illich radically questions the institutions of modern life for their compulsory, normalizing and 
role-enforcing effects. The prevalence of systemic pressures entails that rather than develop-
ing our own interests and capabilities, we are forced to fulfil specific preordained roles.  
                                                          
3 Heidegger’s Nazism has been discussed anew after the publication of his notebooks revealed deeply rooted 
anti-Semitism. So probably there is more to his Nazism than just chance events and character flaws, as suggested 
by Rorty (1999: 192), who portrays Heidegger as a “cowardly hypocrite”. In the end, however, Wheeler’s (2011) 
judgment that we should not be “looking for evidence of Nazism in every twist and turn of the philosophical path 
he lays down” seems sensible.  
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Illich’s book titles, such as “Deschooling Society”, “Medical Nemesis” or “The Right to Use-
ful Unemployment” attest to the severity of his critique. His judgment on the medical system, 
for instance, could hardly be more devastating: “The pain, dysfunction, disability, and anguish 
resulting from technical medical intervention rival the morbidity due to traffic and industrial 
accidents and even war-related activities, and make the impact of medicine one of the most 
rapidly spreading epidemics of our time” (Illich 1977: 17). Note that his critique does not 
concern curricula or the quality of healthcare – it concerns the corrosive effects of education, 
medicine, transport etc. as such. Consider the following claim based on Illich: “even in a 
degrowth-society technologies that are mainly cherished as public goods such as high-speed 
trains or healthcare will inevitably unfold their destructive effects” (Samerski 2017: X). The 
gist of Illich’s diagnosis: in modern industrial societies, individuals have become enslaved by 
technological and systemic imperatives. Tools are no longer means, they are ends in them-
selves. 
In consequence of his diagnosis, Illich promotes strong restrictions on technology and seems 
prepared to let go of professionalized and bureaucratized institutions such as the educational 
system altogether. That said, he does not advocate a complete rejection of technologies; he 
does, instead, favor a “convivial” approach to remedy the degenerating effects of moderniza-
tion and rationalization. A convivial society is one “in which modern technologies serve polit-
ically interrelated individuals rather than managers” (Illich 1975: 12). Conviviality, then, im-
plies that technology and tools are again confined to their prior role as means. Reversing the 
degenerating tendency of modernity, Illich argues, will “remain a pious dream unless the ide-
als of socialist justice prevail” (ibid.: 25). So reclaiming autonomy vis-á-vis technology is 
inherently linked to institutional inversion. Illich offers one possible example of such a trans-
formation from an industrial towards a convivial society: “China has proved that a sudden 
inversion of a major institution is possible. It remains to be seen if this deprofessionalization 
can be sustained against the overweening ideology of unlimited progress” (ibid.: 18). And: 
“With the possible exception of China under Mao, no present government could restructure 
society along convivial lines” (ibid.: 29). Illich focuses on the “barefoot doctors” (laymen 
health workers) as an example of the desired de-professionalization.  
Yet, on several levels, it is puzzling that Illich, who vigorously attacks modernity’s tendency 
towards industrialization and whose philosophy of autonomy directly opposes any form of 
authoriatarianism should name Mao’s China as a positive example: Mao’s “Great Leap For-
ward”, a campaign aiming at decentral forms of industrialization from 1958 to 1960, contrib-
uted to the great famine that probably caused  45 million deaths from 1958 to 1962 (Dikötter 
2010); moreover, Mao’s autocratic rule built on a personality cult and forced-labor camps. 
Illich published his book in 1973, so the defense that he might not have known the full extent 
of the disasters engendered by the Great Leap (e.g. Gomiero 2017) seems unconvincing. This 
is not a guilt-by-association argument against Illich. The question, rather, reads: how could 
someone striving for individual autonomy name Mao’s China as a paradigm example?4 
                                                          
4 Note the parallel to Herman Daly’s embracement of China’s one-child policy as a solution to the population 
problem (1996: 120). 
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2.3 Marcuse or “voluntary servitude in the affluent society” 
In the following, Marcuse illustrates the Marxist tradition of modernity critique: “The just 
response to modernity qua ideology is modernity qua critique; that is, the clear-eyed unmask-
ing of inequities that reveals them to be products of social choices that could be otherwise” 
(Bennet 2006: 219). Overall, this tradition of ideology critique tends to reject the institutions 
of liberal democracy because they camouflage or legitimize the economic power relations and 
injustices that inherently characterize capitalist societies. Marcuse acknowledges “potential 
liberating blessings of technology and industrialization” which can only be realized after the 
dismantling of the institutions of repression and injustice (1967: 68). Thus, modernity is not 
rejected as a whole but rather its institutionalization in the form of liberal democracies with 
their “illusion of popular sovereignty”. 
Marcuse particularly criticizes humanity’s voluntary self-alienation, the reduction to “one-
dimensional” beings within consumer capitalism: individuals consent to their de-facto status 
as slaves in “the affluent society”, confined to work and consumption in perpetual alternation. 
In the characteristically dialectic pattern of reasoning, Marcuse poses the dilemma as follows: 
“The transition from voluntary servitude […] to freedom presupposes the abolition of the in-
stitutions and mechanisms of repression. And the abolition of the institutions and mechanisms 
of repression already presupposes liberation from servitude, prevalence of the need for libera-
tion” (1967: 178f.).  
Furthermore, Marcuse contends that “preaching nonviolence on principle reproduces the ex-
isting institutionalized violence” (1967: 90). In other words, violence may be acceptable as a 
means to overthrow unjust capitalist institutions. Meanwhile, Marcuse has become a main 
inspiration for anti-capitalist protest movements of all kinds due to his promotion of the 
“Great Refusal” (see Lamas et al. 2017), that is, tactics of subversion and civil disobedience 
that may undermine institutional repression. Also, there is a strong indirect influence of Mar-
cuse’s thinking on the degrowth movement in that Marcuse stimulated and shaped Illich’s 
perspective (Muraca and Neuber 2017).  
2.4 Zerzan or “anarcho-primitivism” 
There also exists a radical critique of modernity that has lost all hope and therefore all will-
ingness to cure modernity. This perspective is anarcho-primitivism. In a sense, anarcho-
primitivism takes the critiques voiced by Heidegger, Illich and Marcuse to their logical ex-
treme; anarcho-primitivism is prepared to draw the radical consequence of their dire diagno-
ses – to wit, it advocates humanity’s return to not only anti-modern but even to pre-
civilization lifestyles. Hence, hunter-gatherers are portrayed as the ideal (and only sustaina-
ble) form of human life on earth. This may be exemplified by Zerzan’s volume “Against Civi-
lization”, where he claims that “we have taken a monstrously wrong turn with symbolic cul-
ture and division of labor” and that “the logic of domestication, with its demand to control 
everything, now shows us the ruin of civilizations that ruins the rest” (Zerzan 1999: 221). Al-
so, Zerzan approvingly includes an excerpt of “Industrial society and its future” by Theodore 
Kaczynski, the so-called “Unabomber”, whose mail-bombing campaign targeted individuals 
singled out for their representing industrialized technology-based civilization, as opposed to 
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the aspired nature-centered anarchism. While rejecting Kaczynski’s method, Zerzan promotes 
the same anti-modern perspective, taken to its extreme, primitivist end.  
2.5 Habermas or “the unfinished project of modernity” 
Each of the preceding authors highlighted particular failures of modernity and their overall 
diagnoses vary in severity. Nevertheless, they all dismiss the institutions of liberal democracy 
because they deem these institutions incapable of answering to (or even responsible for) the 
perceived ills that modernity has brought about. 
An important route from a more moderate critique of modernity toward support for liberal 
democracy has been lit by Habermas (1984; 1987). From his theory of communicative action 
it follows that the “lifeworld” (i.e., where individuals communicate to create social solidarity 
and reproduce cultural norms) should be defended against “colonization” by systemic impera-
tives of strategic action and purely calculative thinking. At the same time, this counterattack 
against progressive rationalization of the lifeworld does emphatically not lead to a backward-
looking glorification of pre-Enlightenment societies. To the contrary, the “unfinished project 
of modernity” deserves all support within the bounds of possibility: 
In an extensively rationalized lifeworld, reification can be measured only against the 
conditions of communicative sociation, and not against the nostalgically loaded, fre-
quently romanticized past of premodern forms of life (Habermas 1987: 342). 
Due to this reason, Habermas for example criticizes certain anti-modern trends of the Left-
Green movement in Germany (1994[1980]). 
Habermas considers the colonization of the lifeworld as an excessive form of an otherwise 
beneficial process that relieves society’s members from risks and effort inherent in unmediat-
ed communication by shifting coordination towards “steering media” (e.g. money, power). 
Thus, rationalization as a main characteristic of modernity is not problematic per se; it can 
become so if it becomes excessive, “colonizing”. The solution is clearly not abandonment of 
the “project of modernity”, but rather its continuation through emphasis on communicative 
rationality as complement to instrumental rationality (see also Blau 2011). 
3 The degrowth movement and the open society – no need for enemies with friends like 
these?  
The degrowth spectrum is composed of various strands, some more radical, others more re-
formist; these strands might be subdivided in various ways. One account is provided by Ott 
(2012), who distinguishes four currents within the degrowth literature, three of which strive 
after reform of existing liberal democracies whereas the fourth aims at a fundamental institu-
tional rupture. By comparison, Eversberg and Schmelzer (2017) in their empirical study 
among participants of the 2014 International Degrowth Conference delineate five currents 
with different foci of modernity critique. The more reformist strands aim to correct the hyper-
trophies of modernity (e.g. excessive rationalism, fixation on economic growth and technolo-
gy), yet do not reject the existing institutions of liberal, capitalist democracies. For instance, 
Buch-Hansen (2014) argues that institutional diversity within capitalism should not be ne-
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glected: from this perspective, a degrowth economy will most likely emerge as a hybrid of 
existing and new institutional elements.  
By contrast, other strands issue a dire diagnosis of man’s modern condition. In this section, 
we illustrate how some of these modernity critiques within the degrowth discourse may foster 
(often inadvertently) tendencies to undermine existing liberal democracies. For instance, Es-
cobar (2015) explicitly combines a critique of liberal democracy with an overall critique of 
modernity. Consequently, he calls for “an entirely different logic of socio-natural life, indexed 
provisionally as non-liberal, non-capitalist, communal and relational”, where the transition to 
this logic “will have to involve more radical questionings of growth, extractivism, and even 
modernity than ever before” (ibid: 460f.). In a similar way Trainer (2011: 71) asserts that 
“what is required is much greater social change than Western society has undergone in several 
hundred years”. According to Eversberg and Schmelzer (2017), one important current within 
the degrowth movement are the “Sufficiency-oriented Critics of Civilization”, who have giv-
en up on the project of modernity and long for a fundamental rebuilding of a spiritual, nature-
based and more communal society: they articulate “a wholesale critique of civilization” 
(Eversberg and Schmelzer 2017: 22) and “advocate a return to the ‘lifestyles of previous gen-
erations’”; half of this current believes that “man should return to his (and her) natural place 
in the world” (ibid.: 11).  
Radical critiques against scientific rationalism and technology also tend to call for fundamen-
tal institutional rupture. Consider Gorz’s (whose influence on the degrowth movement “can-
not be stressed enough”, Muraca 2013: 162) critique of technology-based capitalism. Gorz 
(1980) denounces the current socio-technical configurations as “technofascism” (ibid: 17) 
and, specifically in the energy sector, as “electrofascism” (ibid.: 106). Hence, he contends that 
current institutions need to be transcended, that is, radically transformed in order to free peo-
ple from this oppression. More recently, Samerski (2017) argues – based on Illich’s modernity 
critique – that the degrowth movement should “seek deliberate limits to manipulative tech-
nologies in general, including digital devices and professional services”; to this aim, the 
degrowth movement should explicitly stress the “need to downscale institutions”.  
Overall, the “anti-systemic potential of décroissance“ (Muraca 2013) tends to dismiss the cur-
rently prevailing institutions of representative democracy as democratic-in-name-only: Deriu 
(2012: 556), for example, refers to existing liberal democracies as “the so-called democratic 
countries” where “citizens are in fact at the mercy of immense and impersonal powers”, that 
is, corporations. This diagnosis is often accompanied by calls for more direct forms of democ-
racy. In this vein, Asara et al. (2013) consider the quest for “real” and “true” democracy as a 
pivotal part of the degrowth project. Also, anarchism is sometimes proposed as the adequate 
“political imaginary” for the degrowth movement (e.g. Escobar 2015: 457). In sum, while 
different strands emphasize different aspects, they vary a common theme: failure of modernity 
coincides with a failure of institutions of liberal democracy.5 
                                                          
5 Certainly, not all exponents cited in this paragraph reject modernity as a whole. While some authors seem to 
dismiss the ends of the project of modernity, others only seem to doubt that modern liberal democracies provide 
the means towards a degrowth economy. 
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Given the co-evolution of technological and social structures, it seems straightforward that a 
strong overall disenchantment with modernity often aligns with a rejection of existing liberal 
democracies. To be sure, most of the radical critiques presumably aim to preserve and nurture 
core values of the open society such as free speech, freedom of religion and sexual orienta-
tion. Yet, we would like to point out a crucial risk here: the value foundation of the open soci-
ety cannot be taken for granted – doing so might rather endanger these values. Indeed, it has 
been argued that modern mindsets, institutions and technologies are inextricably linked: “cap-
italism, psychological individuation and liberalism emerged together, remain interwoven and 
mutually dependent in complex ways, and depend absolutely on a continually expanding 
throughput of energy” (Quilley 2013: 263). By implication, it would be “highly questionable” 
whether liberal “social and institutional forms would survive the transition to a low-energy 
regime” (279). 
This points to the risk of inadvertently sacrificing core values of the open society: eventually, 
authoritarianism might creep in through the back door. Note that argumentative patterns such 
as “true democracy”, “real democracy” vs. “technofascism” and “so-called democratic coun-
tries” where people live “at the mercy of immense and impersonal powers” share a structural 
affinity (i.e. not necessarily substantial conceptual agreement) with some of the more radical 
modernity critiques sketched in Section 2 (e.g. Heidegger’s juxtaposition of authenticity as 
opposed to modern life in-authenticity). The problem is that if existentialist vocabulary (truth, 
authenticity) enters the political domain, this jeopardizes political freedoms. Such vocabulary 
lends itself to engender disdain for all existing institutions and, in consequence, to justify vio-
lent means in order to overthrow democracies-in-name-only. In fact, the basic values of the 
open society have been explicitly questioned in the name of preventing ecological disaster 
(Heilbronner 1974, Ophuls 1977; see also the critical analysis of eco-authoritarianism in Sha-
har 2015). Finally, consider that someone as Illich, who clearly championed an anti-
authoritarian position, nevertheless presented Maoist China as his only example of the aspired 
convivial approach. Thus, the spectre of authoritarianism should not be lightly dismissed.  
Again, we presume that the core values of liberal democracy are cherished by a majority of 
degrowthists. We just point to the fundamental risk that the values of the open society be un-
intentionally abandoned. Imagine this scenario: disappointment with existing institutions 
leads to welcoming institutional breakdown in the hope of rebuilding a more just society out 
of the debris, whereupon “true democracy” fails to materialize and the values of liberal cos-
mopolitanism are sacrificed somewhere along the way.   
4 Degrowth as transformation of the open society 
How is it possible to reconcile a cosmopolitan, globally integrated, technologically pro-
gressive, science-based and liberal-democratic society which places an absolute value on 
the sanctity of individual human lives, with a more place-bound and communitarian socie-
ty operating with long time horizons and within ecological limits? (Quilley 2017: 453). 
In this chapter, we aim at providing a tentative answer to this question. To this goal, we first 
introduce our perspective on degrowth as promotion of new vocabularies. Second, we argue 
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that this perspective fits well with a deliberative account of democracy, which has important 
implications for degrowth.  
4.1 Degrowth as promotion of a new vocabulary… 
Drawing upon Rorty (1989), the degrowth movement can also be conceived as the attempt to 
promote a new vocabulary. Rorty’s conceptual figure of a “liberal ironist” appeals to empathy 
and aims to reduce suffering via widening solidarity – to do this, the liberal ironist re-
describes the world and creates new vocabularies. The search for authenticity and truth is then 
relegated to the personal sphere and viewed as an individual project of self-creation. From this 
perspective, the primary aim of the degrowth movement is to increase the number of people 
who use a specific “degrowth vocabulary”. 
As a matter of fact, a recent volume entitled “Degrowth. A vocabulary for a new era” 
(D’Alisa et al. 2015) promotes terms such as “commons”, “work sharing”, “environmental 
justice” or “buen vivir” and critically engages with others, such as “commodification”. To be 
sure, this vocabulary is open to debate: notions such as “sufficiency” or “mindfulness”, wide-
ly discussed in the sustainability fields (and also taken up in the degrowth-discourse), are not 
included. Also, some of the contributors may see degrowth as a radical project and perceive 
liberal democracies as failed. But the dictionary approach illustrates our general argument: 
vocabularies represent a means of re-describing and re-framing the world, and thus of intro-
ducing new ideas which, if taken up by the “audience”, would contribute to the achievement 
of the goals of the degrowth movement. 
The idea is not to present one’s case with reference to “truths” that others fail to see or 
acknowledge. Rather, it is about telling stories that demonstrate the attractiveness of a sus-
tainable lifestyle as compared to the “poverty” of unsustainable alternatives. Thus, such sto-
ries promote environmental values, including a stewardship attitude towards nature, or more 
community-centred and cooperative modes of economy, and show how currently prevailing 
lifestyles do not necessarily contribute to leading “good lives”. Here, literature can play an 
important role, too (see also Bina et al. 2017). In fact, there are examples of popular books 
that have fostered a new, degrowth-compatible vocabulary. The classic example is, of course, 
“Limits to Growth” by Donella H. Meadows and others (1972), which sets out the general 
frame of mind. More recent examples include Jonathan Safran Foer’s “Eating Animals” 
(2009), which has raised the awareness of animals suffering as a result of current consumption 
patterns, while also advertising the benefits of a more conscious diet, or Niko Paech’s “Liber-
ation from Excess” (2012), in which he argues that sufficiency and (limited) self-subsistence 
would not be a sacrifice but rather a “liberation”. In a very similar fashion, Ericson et al. 
(2014) argue that mindfulness contributes to sustainability in that it enables people to escape 
the hedonic treadmill – note the essential proximity to meditative thinking as recommended 
by Heidegger. Yet mindfulness is a private matter and cannot be imposed upon individuals. It 
can, however, be promoted as part of a new vocabulary of sustainability and sufficiency.  
Indeed, sufficiency could be a key concept here. The notion of sufficiency exhibits a thor-
oughly Heideggerian streak, as can be seen from the rather poetic closing paragraph of his 
essay “The Pathway” (1969[1948]: 71): 
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Everything speaks of renunciation unto the same. Renunciation does not take 
away, it gives. It bestows the inexhaustible power of the simple. The call makes us 
at home in the arrival of a distant origin. 
This relaxed and, in effect, liberal stance may yield radical consequences nonetheless – to wit, 
if large numbers of people choose to live by it. Does this imply relegating change exclusively 
to the individual sphere? Only in the sense that institutional change needs individual consent, 
but not in the sense that all activity must start from the individual. Analogously, the “merit 
good” literature discusses how corrections of individual preferences can be justified by reflec-
tive preferences or retroactive consent, amongst other reasons (see the overview in Hoberg 
and Strunz 2018). Overall, the point is not to a priori rule out radical change but to ensure that 
the latter is democratically legitimated and driven by persuasion rather than imposed by force 
and violence. Hence, Gorz’s “non-reformist reforms” (1964), that is, fundamental changes to 
the economic structure that follow human needs rather than needs of the economic system, 
may well be in line with the approach defended here.  
In a similar vein, the modernity critique by Rosa (2016) focuses on the impoverished relations 
of man towards oneself, towards others and towards nature. In Rosa’s terminology, processes 
of social acceleration lead to alienation (self-alienation and social alienation, both in spatial 
and temporal respects). This alienation does not imply an essentialist notion of moving away 
from some “true” nature of human being, but rather points to the neglected and diminished 
capabilities of responsive relating to the world. When we are alienated from the world, it ap-
pears silent and cold, devoid of meaning. Note that the processes of social acceleration that 
beget alienation are ambivalent – their negative effects notwithstanding, they are partly bene-
ficial. In consequence, slowing down is no panacea; in some respects, such as internet access, 
acceleration is indeed beneficial. Hence, Rosa (2016) strikes a Heideggerian chord when he 
advocates “resonance” as a remedy: when we cultivate an attitude of openness towards others 
and towards nature (instead of a controlling, calculating stance), we create possibilities for 
meaningful relations of “resonance” that need to be re-invigorated for a meaningful life. 
Thus, it is also possible to productively draw on parts of the stronger critiques of modernity, 
all the while pursuing the project of modernity without dismissing liberal democracy from the 
outset. 
4.2 …within a deliberative account of democracy 
Unfortunately, decision-making processes in existing representative democracies are often 
dominated by vested interests. This leads, among others, to calls for more direct democracy 
and a move away from representative democratic institutions. Here, the theory of deliberative 
democracy can be instructive,6 as it shows that such more direct and participatory (and thus, 
so the assumption, less prone to being captured by vested interests) approaches are not purely 
antithetical to self-interest: “Including self-interest in the regulative ideal of deliberative de-
                                                          
6 The focus of the existing degrowth literature lies on participatory and economic democracy (e.g. Johanisova 
and Wolf 2012); however, we agree with Arias Maldonado (2000) that non-deliberative participatory democracy 
is unlikely to bring about sustainability, at least if the content of the latter is not to be pre-determined ideologi-
cally or technocratically. Furthermore, the issues we discuss here with reference to deliberative democracy are 
relevant for any attempt to democratically bring about a degrowth society. 
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mocracy embraces the diversity of human objectives as well as the diversity of human opin-
ions” (Mansbridge et al. 2010: 73; see also Blau 2011). The same holds for power in imple-
menting decisions reached in a deliberative way (Mansbridge et al. 2010: 83ff.). As argued by 
Sen (2009) and Dryzek (2013), even deliberation in the context of a Habermasian (1984) 
“ideal speech situation” need not necessarily lead to a consensus; there remains an irreducible 
“plurality of impartial reasons”, as partisan actors are still part of deliberative accounts of de-
mocracy, and as such they are “best thought of as discursive representatives, representing par-
ticular conceptions of justice (possibly sustainability, efficiency, etc.)” (Dryzek 2013: 343). 
Participation and deliberation among free and equal participants may but need not necessarily 
lead to sustainability (Arias Maldonado 2000; 2007). 
In consequence, concentrating on idealized, transcendental concepts such as perfect justice, 
true democracy etc., does not help us much in actually making the world less unjust (Sen 
2009) – the deliberative, post-capitalist democracy may be a worthwhile regulative idea, but 
plurality of interests, power relations etc. cannot simply be “overcome”.7 Moreover, human 
fallibility is a fundamental reason for liberalism: that we never can be sure that we are “right”, 
that we know the “truth” or what “authentic” life is (Mill 1859). Funke et al. (2017: 9), para-
phrasing Marcuse, claim that in today’s consumer societies “affluence and technological ra-
tionality replace freedom and authentic individuality” – but who decides what counts as “au-
thentic individuality”? Acknowledging that we may be wrong implies liberalism and makes 
convincing others (e.g. by means of promoting vocabularies) the only legitimate mode of so-
cietal change. 
In fact, the degrowth movement rhetorically embraces its own diversity – but this very diver-
sity also entails different conceptions of what is to be considered as just, sustainable, true or 
authentic. Hence, liberalism should be a basic tenet of a degrowth movement if the spectre of 
authoritarianism re-entering through the back door is to be avoided: “some risk-aversion and 
skepticism against utopias8 might be more helpful for the [degrowth] movement than radical 
chic” (Ott 2012: 580). One such utopia appears to be the notion of man returning to his (and 
her) natural place in the world (cf. Eversberg and Schmelzer 2017: 31). For if the preferred 
narratives of human civilization are purely negative (alienation, exploitation, technofascism, 
etc.), does this not imply a rather idealized conception of état de nature? How can such a per-
spective be justified, given the evidence that even hunter-gatherers significantly impacted on 
nature, to the point of megafaunal extinction (e.g. van der Kaars et al. 2017)? A similar issue 
concerns the popular notion of communal democracy (e.g. Escobar 2015): how can diversity 
within an open society (sensu Popper) be assured against the patterns of tight social control in 
local communities, against “local parochialism” (Sen 2009) or communal violence (Quilley 
2013: 279; see also Diamond 2012: chap. 4)? 
All this does not mean that a commitment to modernity and liberal democracy has to cling to 
the status quo in all its facets. On the contrary, commitment to political liberalism may well 
                                                          
7 Generally, as Ott (2012) points out, theories of democracy must be broad enough to be conceptually neutral 
with respect to specific political movements. By implication, “there can and should be no [degrowth]-theory of 
democracy” (Ott 2012: 576), but some theories of democracy address the shortcomings of existing liberal de-
mocracies in ways compatible with the degrowth agenda (see also Arias-Maldonado 2000). 
8 See also Agnes Heller’s (2016) case against utopianism – and for the merit of dystopian thinking. 
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align with or even demand radical economic reconfigurations to improve distributional and 
ecological justice (Ferguson 2016: 612f.): “liberal democracies can and often must place lim-
its upon the kind of preferences they realize, including preference for economic growth. For 
whilst growth might have once furthered a range of liberal objectives, it now threatens to un-
dermine liberal institutions by destroying the conditions of socio-economic equality and eco-
logical stability upon which they are predicated.” Therefore, it is not liberal institutions that 
are problematic, it is forces that threaten these institutions or instrumentalize them; there are 
strong liberal reasons to tackle widespread injustice and other hypertrophies of modernity 
(Sen 2009; Habermas 1984, 1987; Popper 2011[1945]: 119). To be sure: these threats and the 
danger of instrumentalization are inherent features of liberal democracy of whatever type; 
they are the price for liberal freedom of the individual. The argument here is that they are a 
price worth paying. 
An important corollary is that while the degrowth movement should have a vision of a post-
growth society, the basic democratic tenets of individual freedom and legitimacy of collective 
institutions require that this vision be only an orientation for a societal debate; in other words, 
it must be allowed that the democratic processes lead to an institutional arrangement that dif-
fers from the original degrowth vision (cf. Arias-Maldonado 2000). This stresses the rele-
vance and importance of the Rortian (1989) “liberal hope” that (deliberative) democratic pro-
cesses will lead to the adoption of a degrowth vocabulary and, thus, to a transition towards 
sustainability. In other (Rorty’s) words, a deliberative approach consists in replacing “blows 
by words” or, in Habermas’s terms, in focusing on communicative reason in trying to reach a 
(not the) sustainable, post-growth world (Niżnik and Sanders 1996: 28). 
In sum, the degrowth movement may present its case in a liberal framing, advertising the mul-
tiple positive effects of personal and institutional change. Recent discussions on how to im-
prove the popularity and attractiveness of degrowth vocabulary (e.g. Drews and Antal 2016) 
are very welcome in this respect. Certainly, the process of activating or constructing the right 
frames, that is the unconscious structures guiding our thinking, is long and arduous (Lakoff 
2010): propagating new vocabulary does not quickly deliver transformative change because 
the existing frames may have become institutionally reified, continuously defended by vested 
interests. So far, the degrowth agenda does not enjoy any consent among the broader popula-
tion (Buch-Hansen 2018). This, however, gives all the more reason for the degrowth move-
ment to popularize vocabularies that can legitimate institutional change. 
5 Conclusion 
The degrowth movement has developed out of a critique of modernity’s hypertrophies, and 
rightly so. Modernity critiques often exhibit an ambivalent stance – some aspects of moderni-
ty are to be kept, others to be rejected; as Bennet (2006: 222) puts it, main nodes of modernity 
critique are still “infused with the hope that the world is susceptible to critical reasoning” 
(italics in the original). Nonetheless, the radical currents of modernity critique within the 
degrowth movement tend to dismiss the institutions of liberal, capitalist democracies as failed, 
corrupted and democracy-in-name-only.   
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Against this background, our main argument reads that the degrowth movement should avoid 
conflating a critique of modernity with a rejection of liberal democracy and the values of the 
open society. Some radical strands in the degrowth movement unintentionally endanger these 
values by pushing vocabularies of personal self-creation, truth and authenticity into the public 
discourse, potentially fostering illiberal trends. This is problematic because it takes the 
achievements of the open society for granted. Therefore, we propose to conceive of degrowth 
as a liberal project (including the option of radical change via reform, cf. Gorz 1964); drawing 
upon Rorty’s concept of “irony and liberal hope” and Sen’s and Habermas’ deliberative un-
derstanding of democracy, we showed that not only is this approach compatible with the open 
society, “not giv[ing] lightly up hope that by such means as argument and careful observation, 
people may reach some kind of agreement on many problems of importance; and that, even 
where their demands and their interests clash, it is often possible to argue about the various 
demands and proposals” (Popper 2011[1945]: 431); it also lays out a clear road towards reali-
zation, since by promoting new vocabularies majorities for the degrowth project can be creat-
ed. These majorities will not be created quickly – promotion of vocabularies is a slow process. 
Still the “baby” (i.e. core values of the open society) should not be thrown out with the 
“bathwater” (i.e. modernity’s hypertrophies such as excessive instrumental rationalism).  
While the proposed liberal approach to degrowth explicitly follows Habermas’ call to carry on 
the “unfinished project of modernity”, it might also productively draw on some aspects of the 
other modernity critiques that have been exemplarily presented in this paper. Illich’s convivial 
approach towards social and technological tools has already been widely received in the 
degrowth literature (e.g. Deriu 2015, Samerski 2017). Heidegger’s ethos of releasement seems 
to have been introduced into the degrowth literature only very recently (Heikkurinen 2016); 
there is clearly more to be found in Heidegger’s writings for a liberal approach to self-
sufficient degrowth. So even though Illich, Heidegger and Marcuse may have strayed from 
the liberal democratic path, this does not imply that their experiences and writings should be 
pushed aside. On the contrary, we may learn from their aberrations and thus avoid repeating 
their mistakes. Specifically, one lesson might be to avoid existentialist vocabularies (e.g. au-
thenticity, truth) in the political domain and to conceive of the refusal to conform with sys-
temic pressures primarily as a personal virtue. Certainly, other modernity critiques not ad-
dressed in this paper could also inform a liberal approach to degrowth. Only the most radical 
critiques of modernity, such as Zerzan’s primitivist group in the US, can hardly be reconciled 
with any enlightened account of degrowth (Demaria et al. 2013: 209).  
We agree with Kallis et al. (2012:178) that the revolutionary strand within the degrowth 
movement may play an important strategic role, too:  
What about labour and women rights, the 40 hours’ workweek, social security or free 
healthcare? Weren't these unthinkable reforms at the time that compromised the profits of 
powerful vested interests? […] In many cases such radical agendas have come through 
electoral and social pressure […] it takes radical agendas to take power in order to bring 
about reformist policies. 
In a sense, this paper fosters and sharpens this message: the degrowth movement rightly aims 
to correct the hypertrophies of modernity but it should be more explicit about i) which of lib-
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eral democracy’s and, more generally, modernity’s basic tenets it intends to keep and ii) how 
this is to be ensured.  
An obvious pragmatic question for the politics of degrowth reads: do liberal democracies al-
low for such reforms or has the open society been fully corrupted? Against the latter view, let 
us point out some examples: in 2015, German chancellor Angela Merkel refused to join in the 
fear-mongering over the refugee flow to Europe and defended a more welcoming refugee pol-
icy against harsh critics both among her conservative party colleagues and among fellow 
leaders in the EU. In 2016, the self-proclaimed “democratic socialist” Bernie Sanders won 
43% of the popular vote in the US Democrats’ primaries. Since 2000, twenty-seven countries 
have enacted same-sex marriage laws and a growing number of countries are considering 
whether to follow.9 Needless to say, not all is well; but this does not invalidate the general 
point that there always exist alternatives. The degrowth movement should not succumb to the 
there-is-no-alternative fallacy when evaluating the possibility space of actions – even within 
liberal democracies (Buch-Hansen 2014). This seems all the more important because 
degrowth’s grassroots origins notwithstanding, “the majority of degrowth proposals […] fol-
low a top-down approach” in that they “require direct control by governments […], which 
suggests the need for a high level of state intervention to pursue a degrowth transition” 
(Cosme et al. 2017: 149). Eventually, the spectre of authoritarianism is often quite clear to see 
for those want to see it. Consider that already in 1918, the socialist revolutionary Rosa Lux-
embourg condemned the Bolsheviks’ dissolution of the Russian Constituent Assembly in 
Saint Petersburg – her clear-sighted judgement should alert all those who casually dismiss 
currently existing liberal democracies as failed:10 
To be sure, every democratic institution has its limits and shortcomings, things which 
it doubtless shares with all other human institutions. But the remedy which Trotsky 
and Lenin have found, the elimination of democracy as such, is worse than the disease 
it is supposed to cure; for it stops up the very living source from which alone can come 
correction of all the innate shortcomings of social institutions. That source is the ac-
tive, untrammeled, energetic political life of the broadest masses of the people. 
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